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EU FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND TRANSPARENCY REGULATION: A TEST 
FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POST CRISIS ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE  
 
I. TRANSPARENCY REGULATION AND EU FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE: WHY 
IT MATTERS 
 
X.01 It is axiomatic that, in the wake of the far-reaching crisis-era reforms which took place over 
2008-2014, the ‘single rulebook’ which now governs EU financial markets has become wider, 
deeper, more technical, and more complex, and that the EU’s related ascendancy over its Member 
States with respect to financial market rule-making has become almost total.
1
 The scale of this 
recasting of EU financial market regulation is well-illustrated by the new trading transparency 
regime
2
 which will apply to EU financial markets once the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II 2014 and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 2014
3
 apply to EU financial 
markets in 2019.
4
 As noted in section II below, transparency rules govern the disclosures on 
trading activity which must be made available by those market actors subject to transparency 
requirements; these actors are typically trading venues, in respect of multilateral trading on 
organized venues, and banks/investment firms of various types, in respect of bilateral, off-venue 
trading between counterparties.  
 
X.02 The new trading transparency rules, which are contained in the MiFIR Regulation and 
which will accordingly apply without further implementation by the Member States, exemplify 
                                                 
1
 For discussion see, eg,  David Howarth and  Lucia Quaglia, ‘Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding 
the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks, and ‘Completing’ Economic and 
Monetary Union’ (2013) 51 Journal of Common Market Studies 103 and Eilís Ferran, ‘Crisis-driven 
Regulatory Reform: Where in the World is the EU Going?’  in Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer Hill, 
and John C. Coffee, The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) 1.  
 
2
 For discussion of the new transparency regime see Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets 
Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2014), chapter V; Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Saguato, ‘Reforming 
Securities and Derivatives Trading in the EU: From EMIR to MIFIR’ (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 319; and Nils Clausen and Karsten Sørensen, ‘Reforming the Regulation of Trading Venues in the 
EU under the Proposed MiFID II – Levelling the Playing Field and Overcoming Market Fragmentation’ 
(2012) 9 European Company and Financial Law Review  275. 
 
3
 Directive 2014/65/EU [2014] OJ L173/349 (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 [2014] OJ 
L173/84 (MiFIR). 
 
4
 At the time of writing, the co-legislators are expected to agree to an extension of the current date of 
application of MiFID II/MiFIR from January 2018 to January 2019. 
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the recent crisis-era recasting of EU financial markets regulation in a number of respects. First, 
they take the form of a Regulation and will apply directly in the Member States, thereby 
delivering maximum harmonization in this area.  National discretion, save with respect to various 
waivers, has been removed. So too, accordingly, has the need for local consultation on and impact 
assessment of the new transparency regime;
5
 there are, accordingly, only very limited corrective 
mechanisms available at national level (save for the various waivers available) through which 
regulatory error or unintended consequences can be addressed. Second, and by stark comparison 
with the transparency regime contained in the precursor Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive I 2004 (MiFID I),
6
 the new transparency rules apply to a significantly wider range of 
financial instruments and derivatives.  In a major change, the new rules apply to non-equity asset 
classes as well as to the equity asset classes covered by MiFID I.
7
 In addition, a materially wider 
range of market actors and venues will be subject to the new rules; in particular, a new form of 
trading venue classification, the Organized Trading Facility, is deployed by MiFIR to attach non-
equity transparency rules to those trading venues on which standardized derivatives have 
traditionally traded.
8
 Third, the new transparency regime is significantly more detailed and 
granular than the precursor MiFID I regime. The MiFIR transparency regime will ultimately be 
composed of a series of components: the level 1 rules set out in MiFIR
9
 -  which contains many 
examples of the highly detailed legislative rule-making which is somewhat at odds with the high-
level, norm-setting quality associated with level 1 but which is a feature of crisis-era level 1 rule-
making; an administrative rule-book of vast scale - composed of level 2 Binding Technical 
Standards (BTSs), adopted by the Commission but proposed by the European Securities and 
                                                 
 
5
 The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which is charged with much of the MiFIR implementation 
process, has decided, given the direct applicability of MiFIR, not to engage in consultation on much of 
MiFIR and to carry out only a limited impact assessment, directed to the small number of areas where there 
a degree of national discretion: FCA, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation, 
Consultation Paper I’, CP 15/43 (2015) 8. 
 
6
 Directive 2004/39/EC OJ [2004] L145/1. 
 
7
 ESMA has described the new regime as encompassing ‘an exponential increase in the number of 
instruments under pre- and post-trade transparency obligations’: ESMA, ‘Note on MiFID/MiFIR 
Implementation: Delays in the Go-Live Date of Certain MiFID Provisions’, ESMA/2015/1514.  
 
8
 The UK FCA has noted that the introduction of the OTF classification means that ‘many transactions 
currently categorized as off-venue will come within a multilateral trading environment’ and that overall 
market transparency should accordingly increase: FCA, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
Implementation, Consultation Paper I’, CP 15/43 (2015) 15. 
 
9
 The transparency regime is set out in MiFIR, arts 3-22.  
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Markets Authority (ESMA), and also composed of ‘standard’ level 2 administrative rules, 
adopted by the Commission and in relation to which ESMA provides Technical Advice; and a 
raft of soft level 3 guidance and similar measures, adopted by ESMA. The level 2 and level 3 
elements of the transparency rulebook are still under construction. In September 2015 ESMA 
presented its lengthy proposals for BTSs on the transparency regime to the Commission.
10
 Earlier 
in December 2014 ESMA presented the Commission with its extensive Technical Advice on the 
level 2 transparency rules which will not take the form of BTSs but which will be adopted by the 
Commission as standard level 2 administrative rules.
11
 Fourth and finally, the new regime is 
characterized by a level of technical complexity which can confound all but the most expert. 
ESMA’s September 2015 proposed BTSs cover, for example, the empirical calculations 
governing when an interest rate derivative is liquid for the purposes of transparency regulation. 
12
       
 
X.03 In its design, detail, and breadth, the MiFIR transparency regime exemplifies recurring 
substantive features of the crisis-era reforms which have been extensively charted.
13
  
Accordingly, and given in particular that the new regime displays an intensely granular quality 
and is strongly characterized by immense technical complexity, it generates something of an 
existential challenge for the regulatory lawyer. How best to examine the MiFIR transparency 
regime?  
 
X.04 It is beyond question that, functionally, the new transparency regime is of seismic 
importance to the EU financial market given its strong market-shaping quality. The delay to the 
application date of MiFID II/MiFIR from 2018 to 2019 is in large part being driven by the 
demands of the related implementation process, including with respect to the construction of the 
new systems required to ensure market compliance with the new transparency regime. But 
MiFIR-driven change is not likely to be only mechanical or operational in nature: the MiFIR 
transparency regime will bring fundamental changes to how trading in the EU takes place. 
Measures of a market-shaping orientation are, of course, not a new feature of EU trading market 
                                                 
 
10
 ESMA/2015/1464 (ESMA September 2015 BTS Proposals)  
 
11
 ESMA/2014/1569 (ESMA December 2014 Technical Advice) 
 
12
 ESMA September 2015 BTS Proposals, 104-108. 
 
13
 See, eg, on the alternative investment fund manager reforms Eilís Ferran, ‘After the Crisis: The 
Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU’ (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law 
Review 379. 
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regulation. As has been widely discussed in the literature, MiFID I was a classic market-shaping 
measure in that it sought to change EU market microstructure by using law to liberalize share 
trading in the EU and to reallocate the benefits of share trading from the major trading venues 
(which benefited from a ‘concentration’ rule which allowed share trading to be funneled to the 
major stock exchanges) and across a wider range of execution venues.
14
 Like MiFID I, MiFID 
II/MiFIR also has market-shaping ambitions. But, and reflecting the crisis-era reform context and 
the related driving concern to increase transparency on market activity generally, it has a more 
prescriptive orientation, particularly with respect to share trading. Over the MiFID II/MiFIR 
negotiations, the European Commission and European Parliament sought to reduce the volume of 
over-the-counter (OTC) share trading, in part as EU transparency rules do not currently (under 
MiFID I) apply to such trading. This trading can, accordingly, take place ‘in the dark’ and not 
contribute to price formation.
15
 While the Council adopted a more liberal approach to OTC share 
trading over the MiFID II/MiFIR negotiations, it was also concerned to ensure that trading in 
shares, to the extent possible, took place on open, transparent and regulated platforms.
16
 The 
related political/institutional compromise on share trading, reflected in MiFID II/MiFIR, includes 
a requirement for all trading in shares to take place on organized venues (MiFID II Article 25): an 
investment firm must ensure that the trades it undertakes in shares admitted to trading on a 
regulated market, or traded on a trading venue, must take place on a regulated market, multilateral 
trading facility, systematic internalizer, or equivalent third country venue.
17
 Only those share 
trades which are non-systematic, ad hoc, irregular and infrequent or are carried out between 
professional counterparties and do not contribute to price discovery are exempt from this 
requirement which seeks to move standard share trading on to organized trading venues.  
 
                                                 
 
14
 From the extensive literature see, eg:  Lucia Quaglia, Governing Financial Services in the European 
Union. Banking, Securities, and Post-trading (Routledge, 2010); Ryan Davies, Alfonso Dufour, and Brian 
Scott-Quinn, ‘The MiFID: Competition in a New European Equity Market Regulatory Structure’ in Guido 
Ferrarini and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Investor Protection in Europe. Corporate Law Making, the MiFID 
and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2006) 163; Barbara Alemanni, Giuseppe Lusignani, and Marco 
Onado, ‘The European Securities Industry: Further Evidence on the Roadmap to Integration’, in ibid, 199; 
and Guido Ferrarini and Fabio Recine, ‘The MiFID and Internalisation’, in ibid, 235. 
 
15
 See, eg, the European Commission’s Impact Assessment for the MiFID II/MiFIR proposals (SEC (2011) 
1226, 36-37).  
 
16
 Cyprus Presidency Progress Report on MiFID II/MiFIR, 13 December 2012, Council Document 
16523/12. 
 
17
 The different venue classifications are outlined in section II. 
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X.05 But the market-shaping effects of MiFIR may also take the form of unintended 
consequences. Chief among these is the potential generation of regulatory incentives to market-
makers to decrease liquidity supply in the non-equity markets. There are accordingly 
contradictions within the MiFIR/MiFID II regime as much of the regime is otherwise directed to 
ensuring that the supply of liquidity from market-makers is appropriately managed by trading 
venues.
18
 In particular, the new transparency requirements may increase the market 
impact/position risks carried by those supplying liquidity to the non-equity markets, increase their 
costs, and thereby create incentives to reduce dealing/liquidity supply activities. The new 
transparency rules are accordingly increasingly being associated with the creation of potentially 
significant and unpredictable market-shaping effects deriving from their potential to contract 
trading across a wide range of asset classes previously not subject to transparency regulation, and 
to generate, as a result, related risks to market liquidity (see section II below on the interaction 
between liquidity and transparency regulation).
19
 The new bond market transparency rules, for 
example, may have unforeseen effects arising from the uncertain nature of their interaction with 
the wider market restructuring which is currently re-shaping bond market trading (this re-shaping 
is being driven by a range of factors, including the higher capital charges being imposed on 
market-making activities and the related movement by market-makers from principal to agency 
trading) and which is being associated with a thinning of bond market liquidity and with greater 
volatility.
20
 A concern for bond market liquidity is beginning to seep into EU financial markets 
policy. The Commission’s September 2015 Capital Markets Union Action Plan, which is 
currently framing capital market policy development in the EU, notes market concern in relation 
to the risks to liquidity in secondary bond market trading, and the related risks to the EU economy 
arising from any related future contraction in the primary issuance market and in higher 
borrowing costs for firms. Although the Commission has asserted that the new MiFIR 
transparency regime should increase the attractiveness of the EU capital market, it has also 
committed to monitoring developments in this area.
21
 MiFIR itself acknowledges the 
                                                 
 
18
 MiFID II, eg, imposes new requirements on trading venues with respect to how they engage with market-
makers and in relation to the obligations imposed on market-makers with respect to liquidity: MiFID II, art 
48. 
 
19
 For a recent assessment see ICMA (International Capital Markets Association), ‘The Current State and 
Future Evolution of the European Investment Grade Corporate Bond Second Market: Perspectives from the 
Market’, November 2014. 
 
20
 See recently IOSCO, ‘Securities Markets Outlook 2016’ (2016) 30-37. 
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uncertainties associated with the new regime and supports related review: Article 52 requires that 
the Commission (currently by 2019 but this date is likely to move out), after consulting ESMA, 
report to the European Parliament and Council on the impact in practice of the new transparency 
regime.  
 
X.06 The MiFIR transparency regime accordingly illustrates the extent of the market-shaping 
ambition of current EU financial market regulation, as well as its potential to operate as an agent 
of unforeseen effects. EU financial market regulation has, of course, long been (and continues to 
be) concerned with facilitative market-making/construction and liberalization, as is clear from the 
Capital Markets Union agenda.
22
 But the market-shaping potential of EU financial market 
regulation is now immense - if as yet empirically uncertain. MiFIR forms part of a regulatory 
continuum which includes the 2013 Capital Requirements Directive IV/Capital Requirements 
Regulation,
23
 which is reshaping banks’ business models as it impacts on bank balance sheets and 
lending practices,
24
 and the 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation,
25
 which is 
restructuring the organization of derivatives markets in the EU. Empirical observation of the 
impact of MiFIR will accordingly be of acute importance, and the MiFIR transparency regime 
will similarly provide a rich data-source for analyses of a functionalist/law and finance 
orientation.  The extensive scholarship which has followed from empirical observation of the 
impact of the MiFID I equity market transparency regime on equity markets in the EU
26
 suggests 
                                                                                                                                                 
21
 Commission, ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’, COM (2015) 468, 13-14. 
 
22
 See further Niamh Moloney, ‘Capital Markets Union: “Ever Closer Union” for the EU Financial System’ 
(2016) European Law Review. 
 
23
 Directive 2013/36/EU [2013] OJ L176/338 (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 [2013] OJ 
L176/1 (CRR) 
 
24
 For an early assessment see EBA, ‘Overview of the Potential Implications of Regulatory Measures for 
Banks’ Business Models’ (2015). 
 
25
 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2012] OJ L201/1 
 
26
 From the extensive discussions see eg: Bashir Assi and Diego Valiante, ‘MiFID Implementation in the 
Midst of the Financial Crisis’, European Capital Markets Institute Research Report No 6 (2011);  Bahram 
Soltani, Huu Minh Mai, and Meriem Jerbi, ‘Transparency and Market Quality: An Analysis of the Effect of 
MiFID on Euronext’ (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1833605; Valter Lazzari (ed), Trends in 
the European Securities Industry (Egea, 2011);  and Giovanni Petrella, ‘MiFID, Reg NMS and Competition 
Across Trading Venues in Europe and the USA’ (2010) 18 Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 257. For a summary of the data see Guido Ferrarini and Niamh Moloney, ‘Reshaping Order 
Execution in the EU and the Role of Interest Groups: From MiFID I to MiFID II’ (2012) 13 European 
Business Organization Law Review 557. 
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that MiFIR will generate a powerful case study for examination of the relationship between law 
and markets.   
 
X.07 From a more institutionalist perspective, the MiFIR transparency regime exposes the 
persistence of the deep-rooted political tensions which have long accompanied the EU single 
financial market project, and how political preferences continue to shape EU financial 
governance.
27
 At present, these tensions and preferences can primarily be associated with the 
uneasy relationship between single market and euro-area financial governance, and with the 
resolution of sorts achieved by the February 2016 ‘New Settlement’ for the UK within the EU.28 
But the current euro area/single market tensions are simply the most recent expression of 
persistent and entrenched political differences across the Member States as to how the single 
financial market should be governed and of the related institutional divergences which shape 
these differences.
29
  In some respects, and particularly at level 2, the MiFIR transparency regime 
is almost scientific in its dependence on empirical data and assessment. In others, however, and 
particularly at level 1, it represents a classic EU ‘hodge podge’ of political compromises. In 
particular, the transparency negotiations witnessed serious clashes between those Member States 
more supportive of facilitating market preferences and concerned as to the market-shaping effects 
of extending transparency requirements, and those Member States concerned to extend 
transparency requirements and to ensure that as much trading as possible takes place on organized 
transparent venues. The clashes have left their mark on the waivers which are available from the 
transparency regime, and which became the battleground for both positions. Complex and often 
peculiarly granular in their design, the waivers represent the means through which compromise 
was achieved and particular national preferences in relation to market microstructure protected. 
 
X.08 The focus of this short critique, however, is on the administrative governance implications 
of the new transparency regime. First, and with respect to supervisory governance, the MiFIR 
                                                 
 
27
 For a recent example see Daniel Mügge, ‘The Political Economy of Europeanized Financial Regulation’ 
20(3) Journal of European Public Policy (2013) 458 
 
28
 Decision of the Heads of State or Government Meeting Within the European Council, ‘Concerning a 
New Settlement for the United Kingdom with the European Union,’ European Council Meeting, 18 and 19 
February 2016 (EUCO 1/16), Annex 1.   
 
29
 Initially charted in the Varieties of Capitalism literature and now assessed across multiple dimensions, 
including with respect to the extent bank-based economic systems incorporate market-funding mechanisms. 
See recently Iain Hardie and David Howarth (eds), Market-based Banking and the International Financial 
Crisis (Oxford University Press, 2013).   
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transparency regime certainly exemplifies the extent to which EU financial market regulation has 
become centralized and how the notion of a ‘single rulebook’ has become embedded within EU 
financial system governance. But it also deploys administrative supervisory governance strategies 
to entrench regulatory governance. Second, and with respect to regulatory governance, the MiFIR 
transparency regime exposes the extent to which, some eight years out from the financial crisis, 
the administrative governance system which supports the EU financial system may come under 
pressure with respect to rule-making. In particular, the MiFIR transparency regime generates 
important but potentially intractable challenges with respect to the ability of the current 
administrative process to revise and suspend rules nimbly.  
 
X.09 This chapter first, however, considers the nature of transparency regulation, the 
distinctiveness of the EU’s approach to transparency, and the main features of the MiFIR 
transparency regime.  
 
II. TRANSPARENCY REGULATION AND EU FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 
 
1. The Purpose of Transparency Regulation  
X.10 Transparency regulation governs the mandatory disclosure of the price, volume, and 
transaction information produced by trading venues and, under certain conditions, from bilateral 
trades between trading counterparties, and the availability of such disclosures to the market on a 
real-time basis. These disclosures, particularly in the equity markets, support price formation and, 
thereby, liquidity. But they also perform a number of related functions. In a transparent market-
place, potential traders can see all the orders entering the market and the transactions already 
completed, and can accordingly monitor the execution process.
30
 Transparency rules can also 
address fragmentation risk (which arises where trading in an instrument splits across multiple 
venues) as they ‘tie together’ execution data from different venues and support price formation, 
the pooling of liquidity, and the achievement of best execution. Transparency requirements have, 
in addition, a supervisory dimension: they support supervisors in monitoring the nature of trading 
and in detecting emerging risks, including with respect to market abuse, and, as they allow 
supervisors to monitor liquidity levels, market stability.
31
  
                                                 
 
30
 See, eg, Ruben Lee, What is an Exchange? The Automation, Management and Regulation of Financial 
Markets (Oxford University Press, 1998) 256. 
 
